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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
DUANE ROYLANCE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
STEPHEN L. DAVIES,
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
NO. 10641

Respondent's Petition for Rehearing and
Brief in Su~port T~ereof
RESPONDENT'S PETmON FOR REHEARING
Respondent, Duane Roylance petitions the Court for
a rehearing in this case upon the grounds hereinafter set
forth.
In support of said Petition, respondent relies upon the
following point:
POINT 1

TI-IE COURT ERRED IN LAW IN APPLYING THE
STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF A MOTORIST
TOW ARDS HIS GUEST AS IT RELATES TO UTAH'S

2
GUEST STATUTE, SECTION 41-9-1, UTAH COtE Ac,
NOTATED, 1953.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN LAW IN APPLYING 'D-lf
STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF A MOTOR!~T
TOWARDS HIS GUEST AS IT RELATES TO UTAHs
GUEST STATUTE, SECTION 41-9-1, UTAH CODE A;;.
NOTATED, 1953.
This Court, in its opinion, applied the rule that our
guest statute released the operator of an automobile from
responsibility for injuries to a gratuitous guest lllless thi
operator intendEd the accident to o~cur. I illustrate tit:· ,
application of the standard of care applied by quoting from .
the opinion of Judge Ellett the following three paragraphs
"There was no evidence that the defendant intention· i
ally struck the cement abutment, and the only logi- :
cal inference which could be drawn is that he just cL: ;
not see it."
"In the case of Cusack vs. Longak2r, (C.C.A.2d). ~:
F.2d 304, the h03t, at night, drove by a stop sign at
a spe2d testified to be b2twecn twenty and thirty.five
miles p2·r hour and collided with an automobil2 on the
favored highway. The host said he did not ~ee thr
stop sign, although it had red reflectors to catch the
rays of headlights of approaching cars. Judgment 11ZL'
for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Althou;'
the appellate court found that the trial court Ina
erred in favor of the defendant in giving instruction>
to the jury, which error had caused the verdict, nevrr·
theless, it affirmed the judgment as rendered and di(I

:
I
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so upon the ground and forr the reason that the case
should not have been submitted to the jury in the first
place. The Court said:
'If negligence were all that the plaintiff were
required to prove, he undoubtedly made a case
for the jury; but we do not think that Longaker's
failure to see the sign and his maintenance of a
speed of 35 miles in cro.;sing a street at 1 o'clock
in the morning is evidence of negligence so gross
as to justify a finding of 'wilful and wanton misconduct'.' "

"Let it be assumed that the derfendant drove his
car into the pole and that he did not hit the concrete
ob:=;truction in the highway. One would have to find
that he willfully drove into the pole to make a case
of willful misconduct."
In the United States, approximately twenty-seven
states have sE:2n fit to pass what is commonly known as
the guest statute. Of all of the states which have passed
the guest statute, only two, Kentucky and Washington,
worded their standard of care to require an intent to cause
the accident or injmy. For a complete list of the states
mentioned, see The Law of Torts by Fowler V. Harper and
Fleming James, Jr., Volume 2, page 951.- Of 1Jhe two
states that required intent to cause the accident or injury,
one ,statute has been repealed and the other has been decl21-cd m1constitutional. Kentucky's statute was held unconstitutional in the case of Ludwig vs. Johnson, et al, 49
S.W.2d 347. Washington's statute was held constitutional, see Shea vs. Olson, 53 P.2d 615, but was thereafter
repealed, see Edward J. Crowley, as Administrator de bonis
non of the Estate of Violet N. Mullen, Deceased, Appellant,

vs. Rodney Barto and Barbara Barto h b d
' us an and

Respondents, 367 P.2d 828.

11ii,

This Court, if it now requires proof of an inte .
n1ion~
act to cause the accident itself or injury, now stan,1,, .1
u:; cllvnt
as to the standard of care required of a host towards J.;,
guest when in fact, cur statute, 41-9-1, Utah Code Aruil·
tated, 1953, does not call for said standard.
This Court has herEtofore approved the irn;tructirJ
which was given in the instant case as follows:
"Willful misconduct connotes a greater wrongdoing
mere negligence or even gross negligence. It inclur;c:
a conscious or intentional vblation of definite law
rule of conduct with the knowledge of the peril to t. '
apprehended from such act or failure to act."
I

If our statute and the authorities are examined tlk
' '
intentional act referred to in the instruction approv€d iJ! !
the Court is not the intent to cause injury or to cause ar. ;
accident, but is, as the approved instruction states, a m~ !
scious or intentional violation of definite law or rule c: i
I
conduct with the knowledge of the peril to be apprehendEJ !
1

from such act or failure to act.

'

The case of Cusack vs. Longaker is readily distiJi. i
guished from this case as may be illustrated by the 11')
statement of Torts, Second, Section 500, Subsection o. \
which reads as follows:
I
1

."I

"b. Perception of risk. Conduct cannot be '' •
reckless disregard of the safety of oithers unless 1t1
act or omission is itself intended, notwithstanding thj:
the actor knows o!f facts which would lead any reaso~
. l 't SU~
able man to realize the extreme risk to whic
1 1 '.
jects the safety of others. It is reckless for a dme:

5
0f

an automobile intentionally to cross a through high-

way in defiance of a stop sign if a stream of vehicles

is seen to be closely approaching in both directions,
but if his failure to stop is due to the fact that he has
permitted his attention to be diverted so that he does
nut know that he is approaching the crossing, he may
bf' merely negligent and not reckless. So too, if his
failure to stop is due to the fact that his brakes fail
to act. he may be negligent if the bad condition of the
brakes could have been discovered by such an inspection as it is his duty to make, but his conduct is not
i·eckless."

A 1960 decision from the Supreme Court of Oregon
in the case of .June C. Burghardt, Guardian ad lltem, for
Gary Burghardt, a minor, Respondent, vs. Richard W. Watson, Defenclant, and Janet Olson, a minior by her Guardian
ad litem, Esther Olson, Appellant, 349 P.2d 792, in a specially concurring opinion summarizes existing law as follows:
"O'CONNELL, Justice (specially concurring).
It is evident from our oases, including the more
recent ones, that our interpretation of the guest statute, ORS 30.110, has not been entirely consistent. Note:
33 Or.L.Rev. 216 (1954). Perhaps any further effort
to clarify the matter will simply lead to further confusion, but the need for a consistent application of the
statute is so great that I venture to express my views
in the hope that they might suggest a solution.
To establish a stable position in the treatment of
c.qses under the guest statute we must reach some
m2ac;ure of agreement as to the standard of conduct
which we conceive the statute to describe by the language "gross negligence" and "reckless disregard of the
right of others." One- would be naive to assume that

6
anythi?g more than a ro~gh guide could b2 clE:-J,"·'
by which to test the facts m the hmt-guest cases. ··
if we cut a crude pattern only, and follow it tlin 1
• ' av·.
yers and the trial judges would at least have sorneth ·,
to guide them in dealing with this type of case Lil
I think that a part of the solution will b2 f1Jtmd
in a clearer statement of the problem which confront
us in the application of the gu2st statute. Olli· si~;.
ute, like the guest statutes in most states, is phrased L~
terms of categories of fault. It speaks in the langmc:e
of degrees of negligence, i. e., "gross negligence" whi·.li.
according to the classification from which it is bcr
rowed, is a category of negligence greater than orcii
nary negligence. It also speaks of "reckless" car.du;·[
which is sometimes regarded as a part of the nea!i.
c
gence classi.fication and sometimes as a sepnrate tni:,
of foult. See State v. Wilcox, Or.1959, 337 P.2d 7~7.
It is now pretty nearly universally recognized in r~spectable legal circles that one cannot divide negligence
into degrees. Negligence is negligence, whether thr
conduct invo~ves the failure to exercise great or sllght
care, or any graduation in between, if, under the fr.
cumstanoes there is a duty to the plaintiff. B ·oi.111,
The Law orf Personal Property (2d ed.), p. 327; 2 HDi"
per and Jame3., The Law of Torts, § 16.13; Prosser 2n
Torts (2d ed.), p. 147; Salmond en the Law of Torts
(11th ed.), p. 511. It is prep.er, of ccurse. to postu·
late principles orf liability upon the basis of the ammmt
orf care which, as a matter of policy, should be exercised in varicrus circumstances. This is the W1derly·
ing theory implied in the guest statute.
1

If the statute were applied in accordance "~th iis
language, we would be expected to draw a line in :ach
case between ordinary and gross negligence. Sine~,
as pointed out above, there is no such thing as gru:s
negligence, the court cannot make the distinction sug-

'
'
;
~

i
•.

1
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cc.~tecl

and the> best that it can do is to translate gross

~c>gligence to mean "great negligence" as Mr. Justice
Lusk did in Rogers, Administrator v. Southern Pac.
Co , 1951, 190 Or. 643, 227 P.2d 979, and attempt to
find some practical criterion which will permit us to

draw a line en the scale of fault where we think that
it will carry out the plll'pose or purposes of the guest
statute. This is what we have tried to do in our previous guest cases. Finding it impossible to make distinctions on the scale of fault at the lQIWer level, we
Jerked higher on the scale for a more aggmvated type
of fault which, by leaving a wide chasm between it and
"ordinary" fault, could be more readily differentiated
in applying the guest statute. Thus, it is seen that
the elimination of the less serious instances of aggravated fault intended to be included in the term "gross
negligence," resulted not simply from an effort to state
the legislative policy of the guest statute, but from the
necessity of finding a workable test of fault. The widest gulf and the clear::-st distinction could have been
established by requiring the guest to prove that hls
host intentionally injured him. Taylor v. Taug, 1943,
17 Wash. 2d 533, 136 P.2d 176; Barker v. Taylor, 1938,
196 Wash. 22, 81 P.2d 806; Carufel v. Davis, 1936, 188
Wash. 156, 61P.2d1005; Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143,
53 P.2d 615, 111 A.L.R. 998, affirmed 186 Wash. 700,
59 P.2d 1183, 111 A.L.R. 998.
1

Next lower on the scale is an area of fault which
ha<; gone by various legal names ("wilful," "wanton,"
"reckless") and which can be generally characterized
by th€· actor's consciousness orf risk. This area is sometimes cte2.cribed as negligence and sometimes as somethin<; distinct from negligence. State v. Wilcox, supra;
Prosser on Torts (2d ed.), p. 150; 2 Harper and James,
The Law of Torts, ~ 16.15. The feature which is
thought to distinguish it from "ordinary" negligence

8
is the actor's state of mind. 2 Restatement, 'l'oit~ ;
500, comment g; Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, G;,,
Cal.L. Rev. 91, 143 (1933). Here again Ian°'i"g '·
6L" e r1n
be fashioned to dE\~cribe gradations of fault within th· ..
. If. T h e mo.:;t blameworthy conduct wouid ·hb
area itse
that involved in a situation in which the diivcr. h0;.,e
having aictual knowledge of a high probability of seri:
ous harm to his guest, intent~o:nally elects to expose the
guest to the unreasonable risk. For convenienc:i w:,
might describe this conduct as reckless conduct Tn,;
I. It is frequently described as "wilful" conduct, or
"wanton" conduct, or as "wilful and wanton" condu~t.
2 Restatement, Torts, § 500 describes it as "reckless"
conduct. See Note: Distinguishing Wilful Misconduct,
Wanton Misconduct, and Negligence, 18 U.Cinc.LRev.
319 (1949); Note: Appleman, Wilful and Wanton Conduct in Automobile Guest Cases, 13 Ind.L.J. 131 (19371.
According to some adjudicated cases the language ~
strong enough to indicate that this is the charactet of
the driver's fault which must be esfablishe<l ·bv th'"
guest. Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d
229; 19·±4, 322 U.S. 713, 64 S.Ct. 1270, 88 L.Ed. 1555.
See: Tighe v. Diamond, 1948, 149 Ohio St. 520. 80
N.E.2d 122; 82 Ohio App. 487, 82 N.E. 2d 99: Gran·
flaten v. Rohde, 1938, 66 S.D. 335, 283 N.W. 153. In
some states, it would seem, this standard of conduct i:
set as the minimum for recorvery hy the requirement
that the guest must prove that the driver engaged in
a continued and persist,ent course of action, sometime;
referred to as the "persistent course of act1on test"
Note: 37 Tex.L.Rev. 358 (1958). It should be noted
that if the driver did nort have knowledge of the risk
the test for- reckless conduct Type I is not met by show·
ing that there were facts known to the driver from
which he should realize the danger to his guest. The
latter type of conduct may be referred to as reckl::3s
1

9

ronduct Type II. It applies an objective test of fault
and is easier for the guest to establish than the subjective test for reckless conduct Type I.
If Type I conduct is the test of foult, the guest
would have to produce evidence to show that he warned
1~1e driver of the dangeT, or that the driver had actual
knowledge from some other source that danger was
being encountered. Perhaps no jurisdiction consistently adheres to such a test, and probably all courts
recognize that the requisite consciousness orf risk "may
be inferred from manifestly dangerous conduct." 2
Harpe1· ;md James, The Law of Torts, § 16.15, p. 955,
note call 27. Turner v. Mccready, 1950, 190 Or. 28,
222 P.2d 1010 clearly states that the inference may be
drawn. Mr. Justice Brand said, "The element of recklessness may, under some circwnstances, be infeTred
from evidence of the driver's conduct in the light of
conditions ;:md of what he must have known." 190 Or.
28, 54, 222 P.2d 1010, 1021.
It is likely that a part orf the confusion in the guest

cases arises out of the fact that the distinction between
the two types of reckless conduct described above is
not kept in mind. And even if the distinction is seen,
a variation in the application of the objective test described in reckless conduct Type II will result if the
court changes its attitude from time to time as to the
amount of evidence necessary to draw the inference
that the driver had reason to know of facts which
would lead a reasonable man to realize the danger. It
is posEible that this has caused some of the variation in
the application of cur own gue:;t statute.
It has become common pmctice to express the test
of fault in th;s state in terms of an "I don't care attitude" on the part orf the driver. This phrase has the
viltue of expressing a legal idea in language which can

10
be understood by the jury.

But I believe that 1·~s
~
L ic,011.
erahty encourages "passing judgment in bulk" \Crt,ln
Judge and Jury p. 156) and, moreover ' its en1ph' as1c·.
on the idea of the con:;ciousness of the risk has lt·~ 1 ~
to overlook the other elements orf the t::~st which. ~p
equally, if not more, important.
·
•

The full consciousness that a risk is to be enc 0111
tered will not result in reckless conduct if the prouJ.
bility orf harm is slight, or if the probability is great bui
the harm which will probably result is nat serious
This can be illustrated by reference to the facts in 1br
present case.
There is no difficulty in finding that defendant
was conscious orf a risk when she approached the curve
From her previous use of the particular highway shP
knew that the curve was there, its character
the
speed indicated by the highway sign as the safe speed
to negotiate the curve. The ingredi2nt which is lacking is the high de1gre,e of pro:ba:bility that serious ham
would result. It is common knowledge that curves
are frequently negotiats,d £3.fsly at sp22ds which exC'..:l
the indicated sps·ed pmted by the highway d2partmert.
We are entitled to recognize that rounding a curve at
a spe2d twenty miles in ex02ss of the indicated ~pd
of 45 mile3 per hour do2s not, in itself, show that thm
is involved a high probability of serious harm. Statd
in another way, upon the basis of such facts alone
there is not a sufficient warning of danger to charac·
terize the conduct as reickless.

and

Had it be2Il shown in this case that the curve wa:
sharp, or that there were defects in the highway. er
construction equipment in the road, or other circum·
stance3 known to the defendant which would increase
the risk of harm, the case in all probability would pre·

:

:

i

i

:
:
i
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~

i
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sent sufficient facts to warrant submitting it to the
jury. There were no such facts here.

I believe that the variations in our treatment of
the guest statute in previous cases oan be attributed
in large measure to the use of general language in the
test for fault (such as expressing the test in the formula of an "I don't care attitude") which suggests clearly enough the idea that the defendant must be conscious of tihe risk but conveys little more than that,
and de-emphasizes and perhaps sometimes even results in Eliminating the other ingredients in the test
for reckless conduct. I think that we would establish
rnrl maintain a reasonably consistent position in the
guest cases if we would subject each case to a test which
recites all of the elements of reckless conduct as we
understand that term. I would accept as the test the
definition set out in 2 Restatement, Torts, § 500 at p.
1293. That section reads:
"The actor's conduct is in r~-ckless disregard
of the safety of another if he intentionally does an
act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to
the other to do, knowing or having reason to know
of facts whioh would lead a reasonable man to
realize that the actor's conduct not only creates an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but
also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him."
This section has been adopted in some states in applying their guest statute. DeLoss v. Lewis, 1947, 78 Cal.
App.2d 223, 177 P.2d 589; Espeland v. Green, 1952, 74
S.D. 484, 54 N.W.2d 465.
The adoption of the Restatement definition is not
likely to give us any significantly better guidance in
dealing with the guest cases unless we are careful in

12
each case to apply the definition with referenrt toe
1
As the comment appen:~
to 2 Restatement, Torts, § 500 eArplains, we are tf'stinu
, ,~
for conduct which involves "a high dem-ee
of ,c. 1 1ctn
~
't'
that s2riorus harm will re.;ult from it to anyone ,~:1; 0
is within range of its effect"; it must involve "an ea'ilv
pero2ptible danger"; the danger perceived mu:;t be ~
danger of "substantial bodily hann or death"; thf' c:i;,
cumstances must be such that "the risk so create;i i
unreasonable"; the driver must act or fail to aet "kno11
ing or having reason to know" of facts which wrn1ki
lead a reasonable man to fl2alize "the highly danger.
ous character of his conduct."

or the elements it contains.

Further, I believe that we need to guard against
losing sight of the purpose for which we are seeking
a definition of fault.
The definition we accept is net
an end in itself; it is a part of the process of interpr2t.
ing the guest statute. The question of the amount of
care that must be exercised, or the degree of fonli
Whioh must be found to impose liability under the ~uest
statute cannort be decided abstractly. It mu~~t be re·
lated in some way to the purpci:se for which the guej
statute was enacted. Without the guest statute the
hmt driver would b2' liable to his gue2t for injtin'CS
arising out of ordinary negligence. The legislature decided that a different policy is applicable when an automobile guest sues his host.
It is generally recognized that this type of statute
was intended to "scotch' 'the proverbial ingratitude of

the dog that bites the hand tha:t feeds him' and to put
a barrier in the way of vexatious litigation." 2 Harper
and James, The Law of Torts, p. 961. The statut~
leaves to the judicial system the task of administering
this poJicy as each case is p~esented and the decision
as to whether particular conduct is or is not reckle-:s

13
must be made with reference to that policy. lt is possible that a part of the lack of cohesion in the guest
t:ases results from the failure to anchor the definitions
of gross negligence, reckless conduct and similar terms
to the statutory purpose and in the failure to judge
the driver's case with this legislative policy as a guide.
WhateV?r test we apply, there will always be the
problem of ke2ping our function distinct from that of
the jury. Our sole task is to determine whether there
are sufficiE:nt facts in the particular case before us from
which the jwy can reasonably find that the accident
was caused by defendant's reckless conduct. The
temptation here is to leave to the jury the difficult
task of drawing a line between ordinary misconduct
and reckless conduct. SEe Rinl:evich v. Coeling, 1955,
344 Mich. 493, 74 N.W.2d 12, noted in 34 U.Det.L.J.
169 (1956). But we are charged with the duty of
interpreting the guest statute and of establishing what
we conceive to be the minimum amount of fault which
can still characterize the conduct as reckless within
th meaning of the statute. In setting that minimum
we must not read into the statute our own view of the
policy which should govern host-guest litigation or automobile litigation generally; we must attempt to find
the legislative objectives which pro:npted the legislation.
No sharply defined legislative policy can be discerned,
hut the strong language of fault in the statute and our
understanding of the setting in 'vhich host-guest legislation was drafted gives us a fair intuition with which
to work. But cf., Burrell, A New Ap1Jroa.ch to the
Problem of Wilful and Wanton Misconduct, 1949 In.
Law.J. 716.
With the shift in ideas oif the basis for liability

from fault to comp2nsation which seems to be prevalent, not only in the jury room but in respectable legal

14
circles as well, the application of the statute i11 thP
terms of its original purpme serves to accentuaiu ti·}0
difference in treatment between the automobile vu"',st.
and others in the adjudication of their respective cl,:;n 1;
Green, Traffic Victims, Tort Law and Insur;:mcc ) l'w....•.,.
sim; 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, passim·
Note: 35 Dicta 179 (1958). Perhaps the time hus eorr:'.
when the jury should b2 permitted to treat au1 omoL!k
guests in the same manner as it treats other injured
plaintiffs; but that change must come from the legislature, not from us."
\.I._.

0

Harper and Jamm, in their Law of Torts, Volume 2,
1956, beginning at page 950, dis.cus3 the problem as follows
"§16.15. Care required of a motorist toward hLs
guest. In a leading case the Massachus2tts court ap.
plied the analogy of the gratuitous bailmerrt to the
situation where a social gue3t in an automobile su:d
the owner for injuries caused by the negligence of th
driver. It was held that there could be recovery onlJ
upon a showing of gro2s negligence on the part of the
defendant. Mmt courts refused to follow this lead ancl
the common law rule today in the absence of statute
is that the owner of an automobile owe:; a guest th~
duty orf ordinary care so far as the operation of th
car is concerned. The legislatures in many states.
however, enacted (in the late '20s and the '30s) so.
called guest statutes which relaxed the standard of
care required of an automobile owner towards his gra·
tuitoos passenger. These are not tmiform in their
language. The Washington statute requires inien·
tional misconduct, those of California and Utah "intox·
ication or wilful misconduct." Some statutes make
liability depend on whether misconduct ha:s bf>en "wan·
ton" or "willful"; orthers specify "heedlessness and rec~·
less disregard" of the rights of others. Still other 2.cis
1

15
use the term "gross negligence," and some employ a
combination of the foregoing. It remains to analyze
the main types of requirements and to see what practical effects these statutes, and the differences among
them, have.
Disagreement and confusion have marked judicial attempts to define these terms, even within a
single jurisdiction. Often they add nothing helpful to
the language of the statute itself. The problem of putting a rule into words is even greater if states with
similar statutes 'are taken together. Thus while the
meaning of "intentional" misconduct in the Washington statute is fairly clear, there has been little uniformity in interpreting the oft-used "willful misconduct." A few courts equate the term with "gross negligence," but a larger number distinguish the two concepts and emp ~1asize subjective factors like "intent,"
"consciousnsss," or "knowledge," in discussing willfulness. Similar conflict marks the interpretation of
"gross negligence." Scme courts regard it as simply a
greater degree of negligence, differing from it only in
quantity. Others think the differenoe is so great as
to be one of kind, and such courts tend to assimilate
"gross negligence" to "willful misconduct." "Heedlessness or re~kless mis.conduct" has been treated as
"gross negligence" on the one hand, and as "wanton
misconduct" on the other. All courts agree, however,
that the guest statutes require something more than
crdinary negligence, and most will describe the difference as one of kind or quality rather than of quantity
1

merely.

Out of this welter of words two practical problems emerge: What l{ind of a showing will he required
before a jury is allowed to find liability undeT a guest
statute? And what will be proper language for a

16
charge to the jury? Underlying both these prohle ,
is the question whether willful misconduct (or wDJ..
an.
tonness or recklessness) is to be tested by an objectivt>
or by a subjective standard. We have already exam

ined a similar problem with regard to ordinary negli.
gence and have seen how the test there is largely coJJ.
cerned with external conduct and not with the stirc·
of mind of the actor, even though much of the Jang:
uage used
· ( e. g., " care, " ...mad vertence, " " negi·igenc 2" 1
suggests a state of mind analysis. In rthe present field
the language is even more strongly suggestive of the
courts' concern with mental states and attitudes, and
judicial analysis is much more confusing. The question~
are: (1) Must the host have had any particular state
of mind before a jury may find his conduct willful or
wanton? (2) If the host in fact had a state of mind
characterized by an utter disregard of injurious consequences, may a jury consider that fact in deciding
the issue of willfulness or wantonness?
It is submitted that no particular state of millci
should be required for a finding of wanton or wiJlfuj
misconduct. If defendant's conduct, in the light of
circumstances which he knew or should have known.
involved a high degree of manife3t danger, that should
be enough withcut regard to defendant's mental atti·
tude. Thus if the driver of a trailer truck undertakes
to pass another trailer truck as they both near the
brow of a hm on a tw~lane highway, it should make
no difference at all whether the mind of the overtak
ing driver was filled with anxious solicitude for his
fellow travelers or with an utter indifference to the
probable danger to them.

Most actual decisions simply do not come to grips
with this problem. All agree that a wanton state 0f
mind may be inferred from manifestly dangerous con
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duct. Almost no cases face the question of what the
jury should do if they do ncrt in fact draw that inference - if they find instead that defendant acted dangerously enough but with well-meaning stupidity. A
single California decision would let the jury exhornerate the driver, but there was a strong dissent and the
Restatement of Torts supports the position taken here.
A further and different question is whether the
exisitence of a willful or wanton state of mind may be
oonsidered in determining the issue of liability under
a guest statute. We submit that it should be. Many
cases involve conduct which is negligent, yet not so
dangerous - objectively considered - as that of the
truck driver just described. If it can be shown, however, that the actor was engaging in that conduct with
an attitude of utter disregard of consequences, then
the conduct assumes a more menacing aspect. For
one thing its dangerous tendencies are less likely to
be controlled or counteracted if a crisis arises. Courts
quite rightly, therefore, regard state of mind as a factor to be considered in these cases, though it should
not be a requirement (indispensable to lia:bilirty).

If the foregoing analysis is accepted, then a jury
should be told they may find the host's conduct wan-

ton or willful if they find that he knew or should have

known of circumstances which would cause a reason-

able man to recognize that rtlhe conduct created a high
degree of probability that danger to the guest would
result, or if they find the conduct unreasonably dangerous and accompanied by an utter disregard of possible dangerous consequences. Thus an actor's state
of mind might turn negligent conduct into wantonness.
When we come to consider the kind of showing
which courts will regard as sufficient to warrant a finding of liability under guest statutes, there is far greater
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uniformity than there is as to theory or proper 1
uage for instructions. It is generally agreed, for<Ulg.
ample, that a :ombination of negligent acts may ~~
up to a conclus10n that the actor was engaged in Willful
misconduct. On the other hand, seldom Will a sing!
type of negligent act alone, such as exce:;sive S{Yeede
driving en tJhe wrong side cf the mad, or falling asleep'
make the host liable in the abseno~ of otheT circum:
stances which point to a dispoi:;ition toward reckle&1
behavior. Often the courts give substantial weight
as a factor in proving willful misconduct, to eviden~
of a verbal exchange between the host and guest over
the former's manner of driving. If the guest has protested, the host's reaction to the protest may often shed
light on his attitude of mind. Yet the guest's prot.eJ1E
will not make the host's acts willful misconduct wh~
no serious deviations from ordinary driving are shown."
CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully submits that the Court ernd
in reaching the conclusions that it did reach. Under the
Court's ruling, Utah will rEpresent a view that is not shared
by any other Court in the United States, and will have, by
judicial decision, placed an interpretation up::m willful mJs.
conduct contrary to that of any other court in the United
State;; with a similar statute, and creiate a different stan~
ard of care in guest cases than what has heretofore bt>eI
the law of the State of Utah. This case changes the law of
the State of Utah. 'This case should be re-argued and 1!le
the judgment of the District Cburt affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY H. IVIE
Attorney for Plaintiff and A~

